A further suggestion: we should perhaps emend πορφύροντο to πορφύροντι, since the verb does not seem to occur in the middle-passive before Nonnus (e.g. *D.* 7.170, 12.357, and 47.109 – but he uses the active more than twice as often). Cf. Theoc. 5.125 οἴνῳ πορφύροις and [Bion] 2.18f, καὶ τόσον ἄνθος | χιονέαις πόρφυρε παρηίσι. If we wish to keep all three verbs in this sentence uniform in tense, we could then emend φοινίσσετο to φοινίσσεται (which would allow us to keep the following οἱ of the manuscripts without hiatus), and ᾰ̓ωρεῖτο to αἰωρεῖται. (Ahrens changed these verbs to the present – though he retained the middle of πορφύρω, printing πορφύρονται – but cf. the tense-change in lines 82f.) If a scribe misread the Doric -οντι as -οντο his successors might have attentively put the rest of the sentence into the imperfect. Nonnus, however, shows a predilection for Bionean forms, of which πορφύρομαι may be one, and the use of the middle voice for the active was a poetic affectation not unknown in the Hellenistic period (see n. 2 above); here perhaps on the analogy of φοινίσσομαι.[5]

Stanford University, California JAY REED

[5] I wish to record my gratitude to Sir Kenneth Dover for looking over a draft of this note.

FUSCUS THE STOIC: HORACE *ODES* 1.22 AND *EPISTLES* 1.10*

Our information on Horace's friend Aristius Fuscus, whom he addresses in *Odes* 1.22 and *Epistles* 1.10, is neatly summed up by Nisbet and Hubbard: 'he was a close friend of Horace's (*serm.* 1.9.61 'mihi carus', *epist.* 1.10.3 'paene gemelli'). He wrote comedies (Porph. on *epist.* 1.10) and seems to have had a sense of humour: it was he who refused to rescue Horace from the 'importunate man' in the Sacra Via (*serm.* 1.9.60ff.). Horace says elsewhere that he was a town-lover, who disliked the countryside (*epist.* 1.10); here he amuses him with an account of the perils of his Sabine estate. Fuscus was a schoolmaster by profession (Porph. on *serm.* 1.9.60 'praestantissimus grammaticus illo tempore'); in *epist.* 1.10.45 Horace teases him for his stern discipline ('nec me dimittes incastigatum ...': cf. *CQ* 9 [1959], 74f.). Fuscus is mentioned with Asinius Pollio and others as a critic who approved of Horace's poetry (*serm.* 1.10.83ff.). He may also have written on grammar; cf. *gramm.* 7.35.2 'Abnesti Fusti (*Aristi Fusci* Haupt, *Aufusti* Usener) grammatici liber est ad Asinium Pollionem'.[1] The purpose of this note is to add a further piece to this picture, consonant with Fuscus' grammatical interests,[2] namely to argue that Fuscus was also a Stoic, and that his philosophical loyalties are played on in the two poems addressed to him by Horace.

Odes 1.22 begins with two famous stanzas on the man who is 'pure in heart':

> Integer vitae scelerisque purus
> non eget Mauris iaculis neque arcu,
> nec venenatis gravida sagittis,
> Fusce, pharetra,
>
> sive per Syrtis iter aestuosas
> sive facturus per inhospitalem
> Caucasum vel quae loca fabulosus
> lambit Hydaspes.

* My thanks to Professor R. G. M. Nisbet for helpful criticism.

[1] R. G. M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes, Book I* (Oxford, 1970), pp. 261–2.

[2] On Stoic interest in grammar cf. E. Rawson, *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic* (London, 1985), pp. 117–31.

The moral paragon here, upright, courageous and self-sufficient, is clearly based on the ideal Stoic sage, and particularly, as Nisbet and Hubbard argue, on a recent historical instantiation of that figure, the younger Cato,[3] of whom his contemporaries Cicero and Sallust both use 'integer' or 'integritas' in its moral sense, Sallust (like Horace) conjoining this with the noun 'vita' (Cicero, *Mur.* 3 'Catoni, gravissimo atque integerrimo viro', Sallust, *Cat.* 54.2 'Caesar beneficiis ac munificentia magnus habebatur, integritate vitae Cato'), and whose march across the Libyan desert in 47 B.C. seems to underlie the reference to the Syrtes in line 5. But these grand themes are not further developed in this poem: the poet goes on to compare the conventional safety of the wandering lover with that of the campaigning sage, and talks somewhat archly of an encounter with a wolf in the woods on his Sabine estate, in which the animal ran away from the poet who was ensured of safety by singing of his love Lalage, whom the poet will continue to love wherever he may be. The amusing and erotic content of the rest of the poem tends to undermine its portentous beginning: 'the poem which began so pompously is shown not to be so earnest after all'.[4]

My contention is that this poem has a particular motive for its deflation of the grand Stoic *sapiens* of its opening stanzas, replaced from the third stanza with the frivolous poet/lover: this is done in order to make fun of Stoic views about the absolute virtue of the *sapiens*, something which we find the more tolerant and relaxed Horace doing in another well-known passage (*Epistles* 1.1.106–8), and in order to tease a Stoic addressee who might be supposed to be attached to them. Fuscus' advanced sense of humour is clear from his apparent invention of a Jewish superstition in order not to help Horace escape from the bore in *Satire* 1.9 (60–72), and Horace can be sure that his joke will be detected and taken in the right spirit: the closeness of the two friends allows light-heartedness about seriously held philosophical beliefs (one might compare the way in which Cicero teases Atticus about Epicureanism, in which the latter showed considerable interest).[5] Other odes of Horace clearly cut their cloth to fit the philosophical views of their addressees;[6] Horace is doing this for Fuscus, but in a light-hearted and quasi-satirical manner.

The epistle addressed to Fuscus (*Epistles* 1.10) supports this notion, since it can be seen to contain a number of similar allusions to central Stoic doctrines. There Horace, ensconced in the country, writes to Fuscus, lover of the city, on the virtues of rural life. Two prominent strands in the poem suggest that Horace, on a general level, is deploying Fuscus' own Stoic doctrine to persuade him to a fundamentally non-Stoic *otium*.

First, Horace twice describes his modest country existence as being as pleasant as that of a king:

> vivo et *regno* simul ista reliqui
> quae vos ad caelum fertis rumore secundo (8–9)

> licet sub paupere tecto
> *reges* et regum vita praecurrere amicos. (32–3)

[3] Nisbet and Hubbard, op. cit., pp. 265–6.

[4] Nisbet and Hubbard, op. cit., p. 263.

[5] Cicero can poke fun at Epicureans and Epicureanism in letters to Atticus (*Att.* 5.11.6, 7.2.4, 14.20.5, 15.4.2), but sets Atticus up as Epicurean spokesman in *De Finibus* and *De Legibus*; Atticus' Epicurean sympathies are not in doubt, though he was probably not doctrinaire – cf. N. M. Horsfall, *Cornelius Nepos: A Selection* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 97–8.

[6] So the Stoic *Odes* 2.2 and the Peripatetic *Odes* 2.10: see the commentary of Nisbet and Hubbard on both poems.

This surely picks up the Stoic idea that only the wise or ultimately virtuous man is king,[7] alluded to with some humour by Horace in a passage in the same book already cited (*Epistles* 1.1.106–8); Horace argues to the Stoic Fuscus that the wise man will come to reign in the country, just as he argues to the Stoic Sallustius Crispus that the wise man will achieve a wider reign by self-subjugation than by foreign conquest (*Odes* 2.2.9–12):

> latius *regnes* avidum domando
> spiritum, quam si Libyam remotis
> Gadibus iungas et uterque Poenus
> serviat uni.

Second, Horace early on turns the dispute about the relative merits of rural and urban life into one about living according to nature (12–14):

> vivere naturae si convenienter oportet,
> ponendaeque domo quaerenda est area primum,
> novistine locum potiorem rure beato?

'Vivere naturae... convenienter' clearly picks up Cicero's translation of the precept ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, the ultimate aim of Stoic moral theory[8] (cf. Cicero, *Off.* 3.13 'quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturae vivere'). But Horace uses this precept to urge a life of reclusive hedonism in the country, a wholly unStoic existence, surely once again with some humour. This contrast and clever adaptation on Horace's part has been well noted by Macleod,[9] but it acquires even greater humour and finesse if Horace is attempting to hoist Fuscus with his own Stoic petard; it also gives particular point to the conditional 'si... oportet' here, otherwise rather weak, which will now mean 'if, as you Stoics claim, it is right...'.

Two detailed points in the epistle appear to yield further allusions to Stoic doctrine. In both of these Horace seems to approve the Stoic line rather than making light of it; this might seem to cut across the general use of Fuscus' Stoicism just identified in this poem, but it is not surprising in the overall context of a collection which at least claims to be eclectic and pursuing Stoic views from time to time (cf. *Ep.* 1.1.16–17), and it should be remembered that such positive use of the addressee's own predilections is also highly effective in carrying Horace's philosophical message across, something not entirely absent from the poem for all its humour.

First, at lines 25–9 Horace draws an analogy between lack of connoisseurship in cloth, failing to tell imported from Italian dyes, and lack of correct knowledge in philosophical terms, being unable to distinguish between truth and falsehood. The latter is of course highly undesirable and much more than a mere financial liability:

> non qui Sidonio contendere callidus ostro
> nescit Aquinatem potantia vellera fucum
> certius accipiet damnum propiusve medullis,
> quam qui non poterit vero distinguere falsum.

Here in the idea of distinguishing of false from true Horace evidently takes up a Stoic line of thought. The Epicureans' relative lack of interest in logic and belief in the truth of all sense-perception had led them into problems about judging true from false, as Cicero, speaking himself in his critique of Epicurean views in the first book of the *De Finibus*, points out (*Fin.* 1.22):

[7] Cf. *SVF* iii.81.31, 158.35, 241.36.
[8] Cf. *SVF* iii.3.4–7.12.
[9] C. W. Macleod, *Horace: The Epistles* (Rome, 1986), p. 27.

⟨Epicurus⟩ non qua via captiosa solvantur ambigua distinguantur ostendit: iudicia rerum in sensibus ponit, quibus si semel aliquid *falsi pro vero* probatum sit, sublatum esse omne iudicium veri et falsi putat.

By contrast, the Stoic *sapiens* has access to the criterion of knowledge by which false can be separated from true, as Cicero, again speaking *in propria persona*, says in the *Academica Priora* (2.67):

Sed illud primum, sapientem, si adsensurus esset, etiam opinaturum, falsum esse et Stoici dicunt et eorum adstipulator Antiochus: posse enim eum *falsa a veris* et quae non possint percipi ab lis, quae possint, *distinguere*.

A second Stoic point is similarly argued for at lines 39–41, where the man who fears poverty is said to lack freedom – his fear of losing his riches and inability to contemplate life on a small income means that he will carry his anxieties as a burden for ever:

> sic qui pauperiem veritus potiore metallis
> libertate caret, dominum vehet improbus atque
> serviet aeternum, quia parvo nesciet uti.

Here the imagery of freedom and slavery has undoubed Stoic overtones: *libertas*, freedom, is one of the great Stoic values, and like all the virtues is properly possessed only by the *sapiens* or truly wise man, as Horace had already noted at the end of *Epistles* 1.1 (106–7):

> ad summam, sapiens uno minor est Iove, dives,
> liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum;

Slavery to riches is explicitly contrasted with the *libertas* of the Stoic *sapiens* by Seneca in the *De Vita Beata* – the wise man has riches as his slave, rather than the converse (26.1 'divitiae enim apud sapientem virum in servitute sunt, apud stultum in imperio'), and is truly rich not with material goods but with the wealth of virtue. Just to underline that a Stoic position is being used here, Horace includes in his signing-off to Fuscus assertions that his addressee knows how to live *sapienter*, i.e. in the true virtuous manner of the Stoic *sapiens*, and consequently how to avoid being enslaved to riches (44, 47):

> laetus sorte tua vives sapienter, Aristi
>
> imperat aut servit collecta pecunia cuique

Thus the Stoicism of Fuscus in *Epistles* 1.10 is being used in two slightly different ways. He is being urged that living in the country fulfils the highest Stoic ideals, a case which is not wholly serious, for, as already implied, the tranquil and self-indulgent rural existence described by Horace in this poem is unlikely to appeal to the self-denying active virtue of the Stoics, and is much more Epicurean.[10] In this respect the epistle addressed to Fuscus appears to carry on the spirit of *Odes* 1.22; in both cases, Fuscus is affectionately teased through Horace's amusing deployment of his friend's Stoic beliefs. On the other hand, the serious moralising use in the poem of Stoic doctrines about the wise man's ability to tell true from false and his resistance to the slavery of wealth points to the greater didactic programme of the first book of *Epistles*. Here the conjunction of philosophical moralising with a humorous approach is far from paradoxical and frequently deployed, and there is no problem of consistency: Stoic doctrine can be presented either straightforwardly or lightheartedly

[10] Cf. Macleod, loc. cit.

in the book as a whole,[11] and it is no surprise to find Horace doing both these things within the same epistle, especially when Stoicism is likely to be the favoured sect of its addressee: both teasing about Stoicism and Stoic exposition are here very much *ad hominem*, and equally effective in Horace's general enterprise in the first book of *Epistles*, that of mild philosophical protreptic directed towards his friends.[12]

Corpus Christi College, Oxford S. J. HARRISON

[11] Contrast with the humorous treatment already observed the positive presentation of Stoic views on suicide in *Ep.* 1.16.73ff.

[12] Cf. S. J. Harrison, *CQ* 38 (1988), 473–6.

LIVY AND CLODIUS LICINUS*

In 204 B.C. Pleminius, after perpetrating appalling atrocities at Locri, was sent back to Rome, and his fate is described at Livy 29.22.7–10:[1]

Pleminius quique in eadem causa erant, postquam Romam est uentum, extemplo in carcerem conditi. ac primo producti ad populum ab tribunis, apud praeoccupatos Locrensium clade animos nullum misericordiae locum habuerunt; postea cum saepius producerentur, iam senescente inuidia molliebantur irae, et ipsa deformitas Plemini memoriaque absentis Scipionis fauorem ad uolgum conciliabat. mortuus tamen prius in uinculis est quam iudicium de eo populi perficeretur. (§10) hunc Pleminium Clodius Licinus in libro tertio rerum Romanarum refert ludis uotiuis, quos Romae Africanus iterum consul faciebat, conatum per quosdam quos pretio corruperat aliquot locis urbem incendere, ut refringendi (*Luchs*: fringendi *codd.*: effringendi *Weissenborn*)[2] carceris fugiendique haberet occasionem; patefacto deinde scelere relegatum (*Conway*: delegatum *codd.*) in Tullianum ex senatus consulto.

We are at once confronted with an anomaly: for nowhere else does Livy refer to the obscure Clodius Licinus. In his *editio maior* of books twenty-six to thirty August Luchs deleted the whole of §10 as an interpolation,[3] and the resulting text runs smoothly and coherently from §9 to §11. But, though Luchs's arguments have won some acceptance from historians, editors of Livy have been unimpressed: Conway and Johnson dismissed the conjecture with contumely;[4] and it has also been rejected by e.g. M. Müller, H. J. Müller, F. G. Moore,[5] and now by Professor Walsh. Yet the arguments in favour of deletion are powerful, and a full exposition of them is needed.

I

The nature of the MS. tradition at this point bears importantly on the question, and formed a vital part of Luchs's evidence.[6] The text of Book 29 is to be constituted from

* I am most grateful to Dr J. Briscoe, Professor M. D. Reeve, and Professor P. G. Walsh for improving an earlier draft of this article, and to Professor Reeve for pointing out to me the interest of the problem.

[1] I quote from the 1986 Leipzig Teubner Text of P. G. Walsh.

[2] The solution of this textual problem does not affect the argument.

[3] A. Luchs, *Titi Livi Ab Urbe Condita Libri A Vicesimo Sexto Ad Tricesimum* (1879), pp. lxvii–viii. However, in his *editio minor* of 1889 he suppressed his conjecture entirely.

[4] In their note ad loc. in the *apparatus* to their Oxford Classical Text (1935).

[5] Respectively (1884) in his revision of Weissenborn's Teubner Text, (1910) in his revision of Weissenborn's commentary, and in the Loeb edition (1949).

[6] The most recent and clearest treatments are by M. D. Reeve in *RFIC* 115 (1987), 405–40 and in J. Diggle, J. B. Hall and H. D. Jocelyn (edd.), *Studies in Latin Literature and its Tradition in Honour of Charles Brink* (1989), pp. 97–112; Reeve discusses our passage at *RFIC*, p. 418 n. 2 in conjunction with the fragmentary MS. from Nancy (cited henceforth as Y).